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Introduction
The U.S. banking industry has a long tradition
of decentralization as measured by geographic
market structure. This feature largely reflects
the impact of both inter- and intrastate branch-
ing restrictions as well as regulatory policies to-
ward mergers and acquisitions. As a result of
these policies, the industry comprises many-
small banks that operate in relatively localized
and structurally diverse markets. In states al-
lowing branching, banks tend to be fewer but
larger than in unit banking states.
The phenomenon of bank holding companies
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a response
to restrictions on the scale and scope of bank-
ing activities. By holding banks as affiliates, a
holding company can expand the geographic
scale of its banking operations and broaden the
scope of its nonbank activities to certain per-
missible lines of financial services. During the
1970s and 1980s, both the number of bank
holding companies and the share of banks so
affiliated increased, partly as a response to
regulatory changes (Savage [1982], Amel and
Jacowski [1989]). However, the trend also re-
flects changes in the environment in which
these organizations operate.
While the U.S. banking industry has been con-
solidating into holding companies, it also appears
to be shrinking. Domestic nonfinancial-sector
debt grew substantially faster than GDP in the
past decade, but the share of intemiediated
funds advanced by banks fell from 50 percent to
36 percent. The number of banks contracted by
nearly 21 percent, from more than 14,400 in 1982
to about 11,400 at the end of 1992. The decade
also witnessed a dramatic rise in bank failures
and a spate of asset quality problems that trans-
lated into low industry profitability.
In assessing these trends, analysts have de-
voted considerable attention to the regional na-
ture of the banking industry. Disparities in bank
profitability over the past decade have been
widely attributed to differences in local economic
fortunes. Bank failures were largely concentrated
in states experiencing economic difficulties. More
recently, the poor performance of banks in New
England and California has been associated with
the so-called bicoastal recession.
Regional banking conditions also reflect the
structural diversity across state banking sectors.
Historically, bank failures have tended to occur
in unit banking states, whereas institutions in
branch banking states seem to have fared betterduring periods of economic adversity.
1 In the
past several years, however, the problems con-
centrated in large banks have raised concerns
that a "too big to fail" regulatory policy is en-
couraging excessive risk-taking.
2
Differences in economic fortunes and in
bank structure across states complicate the as-
sessment of industry performance. Are certain
types of banks performing poorly because
they are inherently different from other types
of banking organizations, or do they happen
to be concentrated in regions where the local
economy is faltering? In this paper, I exploit
the differences both within and across states in
an attempt to evaluate how these factors were
related to banking sector performance during
the past decade. Performance refers to stan-
dard measures of banking conditions, including
bank profitability, asset quality, capitalization,
and lending. Data are compiled from individ-
ual Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council's Reports of Condition and Income
(call reports) for each year between 1984 and
1992. I disaggregate state-level balance sheets
and income statements to construct perform-
ance measures for banks that differ in size as
well as in their holding company relationships.
Then, controlling for state-specific economic
factors, I examine the extent to which dispari-
ties in performance have been associated with
differences in these bank characteristics.
The tone of this analysis is descriptive; the
parsimonious number of relationships examined
precludes a more causal interpretation. The find-
ings reveal that the health of the local economy
is indeed important in assessing the performance
of the local banking sector. However, differences
in banking conditions also appear to be associ-
ated with bank size and holding company affili-
ation; moreover, the emergent relationships are
consistent with microeconomic studies that exam-
ine individual bank performance (Berger, Han-
weck, and Humphrey [1987]). The results indicate
that, controlling for local economic factors, rela-
tively small banks (assets between $100 million
and SI billion in 1987 dollars) turned in the best
performance over the past decade. In addition,
smaller institutions that were affiliated with
multibank holding companies had fewer prob-
lems with asset quality than did other small
banks. Alternatively, the largest institutions —
almost all of which belong to multibank hold-
ing companies — were less profitable. Hence,
although banking fortunes reflect those of the
local economy, performance also appears to
be related to local industry structure. Judging
at least by the experience of the 1980s, it




Assessments of the banking industry frequently
describe it as a composite of banks that differ
in size and location. For example, the FDIC
Quarterly Bulletin presents industry data on
banks classified by size and geographic region.
3
This focus reflects the view that such factors are
important determinants of banking conditions.
The term bank structure is frequently used
when referring to the characteristics of banking
markets as well as those of individual institu-
tions. Individual bank characteristics, such as the
scale and scope of operations, can affect the
costs at which banks produce financial serv-
ices; hence the rationale for the focus on bank
size. Market structure, measured by the relative
size and number of firms, can influence the de-
gree of local competition and, by extension,
the quality, quantity, and price of financial serv-
ices ultimately available to bank customers.
Researchers have studied how both market
structure and individual bank characteristics
are related to bank performance. One genre of
studies looks at how market concentration is
related to bank profitability and to the cus-
tomer's cost of banking services.' Most find-
ings reveal a positive relationship between
market concentration and bank profitability.
This result has been cited as evidence that
more concentrated markets are less competi-
tive. However, it also has been interpreted as
an indication that more efficient firms tend to
dominate the marketplace. A second line of re-
search looks at how the costs associated with
prociucing financial services are related to a
• 1 This trend is less true in recent years. With the exception of
Texas, failures during the past decade were not disproportionately located
in unit banking states. Moreover, Wheelock (1993) notes that the choice
of unit banking restrictions was popular in states with relatively cyclical
economies, such as agricultural states.
• 2 See Boyd and Gertler (1993) for a recent evaluation of this
perspective.
• 3 Similarly, assessments of changes in the structure of banking
markets focus on how the geographic distribution of banks and the atten-
dant concentration of banking markets have evolved (Amel and Jacowski
[1989]).
• 4 For example, see Berger and Hannan (1989).BOX 1: DEFINITIONS
Structural Characteristics
of Bank Cohorts
Size Classes (1987 dollars)
Veiy small: Less than $100 million in assets.
Small: $100 million to $500 million in assets.
Medium: $500 million to $1 billion in assets.
Large: $1 billion to $10 billion in assets.
Very large: More than $10 billion in assets.
Holding Company Affiliations
MBHC: Bank holding company holding more than one bank.
SBHC: Bank holding company holding only a single bank.




Capitalization: Bank equity capital as a percentage of total
assets.
C&I lending: Commercial and industrial loans as a percent-
age of total assets.
CRE lending: Commercial real estate loans as a percentage
of total assets.
Total bank lending: Total loans (including C&I loans, CRE
loans, home mortgages, consumer loans, and other loans)
as a percentage of total assets.
Bank Profitability and Asset Quality
ROA: Return on assets as measured by the ratio of annual
net income to total assets.
Nonperforming assets: Past due loans (more than 90 days)
plus nonaccruing assets plus other real estate owned, as a
percentage of total assets.
Net loan charge-offs: The ratio of annual net charge-offs
for loan losses to total bank loans as defined above.
NOTE: All measures use fourth-quarter data from the Federal Financial Insti-
tutions Examination Council's Reports of Condition and Income (call reports).
Each performance measure is constructed from the cohort-level balance sheet or
income statement. For example, ROA for each size class of banks is measured
as the ratio of net income to total assets for each respective cohort of banks.
bank's structural characteristics.
1 Although the
results are mixed, these cross-sectional assess-
ments of bank efficiency have found evidence
of modest economies of scale; the costs of pro-
viding banking services decline as firm size in-
creases up to a relatively small size (Berger,
Hanweck, and Humphrey [1987]).
The potential for the characteristics of banks
and banking markets to affect industry perform-
ance motivates our interest in the phenomenon
of bank holding companies. The importance of
viewing holding company affiliation as a struc-
tural characteristic of banks depends on whether
a bank in a holding company behaves differently
than it would as an unaffiliated entity. At one
extreme, holding companies may be passive ve-
hicles that diversify across a number of banks
and allow almost all decisions to be made at the
subsidiary level. In this case, holding company
affiliation might be unrelated to a bank's perform-
ance because it does not affect the bank's behav-
ior. At the other extreme, if a bank can draw on
its relationship with its holding company (for ex-
ample, by reducing certain operating costs or
increasing portfolio diversification through inter-
bank loan sales), it may perform more like a
larger institution.
Here, my focus on the link between the
structural characteristics of banks and industry
performance at the state level is more macro-
economic than microeconomic in nature. To
the extent that banking conditions may impact
credit availability, they may also affect eco-
nomic activity. In a previous study using state-
level data from the past decade (Samolyk
[1992]), I found evidence suggesting that the
health of the local banking sector plays a role
in local economic fortunes. Banking conditions
were more strongly related to current real per-
sonal income growth in states where the health
of the banking sector was poor than in states
where it was sound. Moreover, this relation-
ship was not simply mirroring a correlation be-
tween banking conditions and past income
growth. These findings suggest that if local
bank characteristics affect local industry per-
formance, they may have important economic-
consequences.
Both market factors and regulatory policies
determine the structural characteristics of
banks and banking markets. Here, I merely ex-
amine whether these characteristics have been
associated with differences in banking sector
performance. For example, small, localized
banks may be more vulnerable to local eco-
nomic distress, while larger banks are able to
diversify over regional or even national markets.
Thus, the state is not defined as the relevant
"market" for banks of all types. Nevertheless,
performance differentials across the various
types of banking institutions within a state may
provide evidence as to how bank characteris-
tics can affect local banking conditions.
• 5 The scale of a bank's activities is usually defined in terms of bal-
ance sheet stocks, such as the volume of lending. The scope of a bank's
activities refers to the composition of financial services it provides (for ex-
ample, making loans versus funding securities). See Clark (1988) for a
survey of these studies.TABLE 1
Banks and Banking Assets
Panel A By Individual
Bank Size
By Size of Largest
Banking Organization
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At the end of 1992, 11,419 domestic commer-
cial banks filed call reports. Of these institu-
tions, 71.7 percent were affiliates of a bank
holding company. Of holding company affili-
ates, 40.3 percent were part of multibank hold-
ing companies and 59.7 percent were affiliates
of single bank holding companies. Following
convention, I characterize a bank's size in terms
of the dollar value of its assets. Banks are
placed in five size categories, which are ad-
justed for inflation so that a bank's classification
will change only if its asset size has changed
in real terms.
6 The inflation-adjusted (constant
dollar) ranges for the five size cohorts are pre-
sented in box 1. Between 1984 and 1992, the
unadjusted (current dollar) ranges of these size
classes rose by approximately one-third.
Panel A of table 1 shows the distributions of
banks and bank assets across the five categories.
It also presents the distributions of banks and
banking assets when each bank is classified by
the size of its largest related organization. For
example, in classifying a $100 million bank that
is a subsidiary of a holding company with as-
sets of $5 billion, I include that bank's data in
the larger size cohort. This classification illus-
trates the distribution of banking assets by firm
size when multibank holding companies are
treated as branches of the holding company.
7
Panel A shows the trend toward fewer, larger
banks in the industry: The number of very
small banks has declined markedly. It also indi-
cates that at the holding company level, the
past decade has witnessed very large banking
organizations growing into even larger ones.
Panel B of table 1 presents the distribution
of banks and of banking assets classified by
both size and holding company affiliation as
defined in box 1. It indicates that the decline
in the number of small and very small banks
reflects decreases in both holding company
affiliates and unaffiliated (independent) institu-
tions. These data also underscore the emer-
gence of the bank holding company as a prom-
inent organizational entity. However, inde-
pendent banks continue to be well represented,
especially among smaller institutions.
Panel B of table 1 is also useful for under-
standing the measures employed in assessing
banking conditions at both the national and
• 6 Both the FDIC Quarterly Report and the Federal Reserve Bulletin
publish data on performance trends for banks classified by nonindexed size
cohorts. Empirical studies that use cross-sectional data in a given year do
not need to index nominal asset size classifications. However, studies that
pool data on banks across time should deflate asset values into real terms to
evaluate differences associated with bank size. For example, Avery and Ber-
ger (1991) index their classification of large and small banks in assessing
the implications of risk-based capital on these segments of the industry.
I 7 The data on the number of banks require more clarification, as
this category refers to the number of banks affiliated with holding compa-
nies of a given size, not the number of holding companies of that size.
This indicates the potential misclassification associated with ignoring
holding company affiliations.TABLE 2
Bank Balance Sheets:
Lending and Capitalization
(percentage of bank assets)
All Very . Very
Banks Small Small Medium Large Large
Bank lending
1984 60.2 52.9 56.5 58.5 60.5
1989 62.4 52.9 60.0 65.2 65.4
1992 58.0 51.6 56.7 60.0 60.1
Commercial and industrial loans
1984 22.6 13.1 16.8 18.9 21.0
1989 18.8 10.7 13.9 16.9 18.8
1992 15.3 8.8 10.5 12.2 14.8
Commercial real estate loans
1984 7.3 6.9 10.1 9.4 8.3
1989 11.3 9.2 13.5 14.8 13.2
1992 10.4 10.2 14.1 14.5 11.4
Capitalization
1984 6.1 8.6 7.2 6.9 5.8
1989 6.2 8.9 7.6 6.7 6.1














the state level. The focus here is on how per-
formance differs across banks of various sizes
and holding company affiliations. I construct
national-level fourth-quarter performance meas-
ures for each of the five size classes (and each
size class disaggregated by the three types of
holding company relationships) by first aggre-
gating the call report data for U.S. commercial
banks in the size cohorts illustrated in panel B.
The aggregated balance sheet and income
statement of each cohort is then used to con-
struct measures of capitalization, lending, bank
profitability, and asset quality. These measures
are defined in box 1. The state-level measures
analyzed in the study are also constaicted in
this manner—albeit with the call report data
on the individual banks for a given state. As a
point of reference, I first examine the recent





Table 2 illustrates bank lending and capitaliza-
tion (as percentages of bank assets) for the
five size cohorts of commercial banks in se-
lected years. Despite distinct differences in
both loan/asset and capital/asset ratios across
the size classes, these balance sheet measures
have moved somewhat in concert during the
past decade.
Larger banks appear to have invested a
greater percentage of assets in loans than did
smaller banks. While loan/asset ratios moved
procyclically in medium and large banks, very
small and very large banks did not exhibit this
portfolio shift.
8 However, banks of all sizes
changed the types of loans they funded over the
period. The percentage of assets invested in
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans declined
and the percentage held as commercial real
estate (CRE) loans rose in all segments of the
industry. Large and very large banks moved
most aggressively into CRE lending in the mid-
1980s and have subsequently retrenched. For
smaller banks, the monotonic shift to funding
CRE loans is more indicative of a secular trend
than of a cyclical real estate boom (and subse-
quent bust).
Larger banks also appear to have been less
capitalized than smaller banks. However, the
greatest disparities across the size classes oc-
curred early in the 1980s, when industry capi-
talization was below 6 percent. Until the late
1970s, smaller banks faced higher capital re-
quirements: They were viewed as riskier be-
cause they could not diversify as much as
larger institutions. Subsequently, regulatory
changes have eliminated differences in capital
ratios based on size in favor of requirements
associated with portfolio risk. The result has
been that capitalization has increased in the in-
dustry as a whole, but by relatively more in
larger banks.
There also appear to be differences in bank
lending and capitalization across similar-sized
banks that vary in holding company affiliation.
The panels in figure 1 depict capitalization and
loan/asset ratios for very small banks sorted by
their holding company relationships. Multibank
holding company affiliates were less capital-
ized than otherwise affiliated institutions and
made more loans than other very small banks,
• 8 See Boyd and Gertler (1993) for documentation of trends over
the postwar period.FIGURE 1
Capitalization and Loan/Asset
Ratios for Very Small Banks:
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although the differences in loan/asset ratios di-
minished over the decade. Thus, in terms of
lending and capitalization, industry-level data
suggest that multibank holding company affili-
ates behaved more like "larger" institutions
than did other very small banks. This also ap-
pears to have been the case for small banks.
IV. Trends in Bank
Profitability and
Asset Quality
Differences in loan/asset ratios and bank capi-
talization are important factors in assessing the
relative profitability and risk of banks. How-
ever, these variations do not inevitably trans-
late into differences in risk or profitability.
Although loans are a relatively risky class of in-
vestments (compared to securities), banks that
have higher loan/asset ratios do not necessar-
ily have riskier portfolios. Larger banks (or
those affiliated with multibank holding compa-
nies) may be able to diversify the risks in their
loan portfolios more successfully than smaller,
more localized institutions. Moreover, larger
banks may be profitable in spite of lower profit
margins because their higher leverage allows
them to pay a greater return to stockholders
for a given return on their assets.
As evidenced by capital requirements in the
past, smaller banks were viewed as riskier be-
cause of their limited ability to diversify. In the
1980s, government policies may have changed
the relationship between bank size and bank
risk by reducing the incentives for banks to man-
age losses paidently (Boyd and Graham [1991] )•
Deregulation, in tandem with changes in the
treatment of problem institutions, may have in-
creased the risks that uninsured investors allow
banks — especially larger ones — to assume.
The policy that banks can be too big to fail and
the usual method of resolving bank failures (via
purchase and assumption by healthy banks) shift
the cost of bank failure from these investors to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (and
ultimately to taxpayers).
Unfortunately, ex ante portfolio risk and ex-
pected risk-adjusted yields are unobservable,
so I examine data on ex post performance to
infer indirectly how the risk-return relationship
may vary across types of banks. I employ stan-
dard industry ratios used to measure bank profit-
ability and asset quality (see box 1). Bank
profitability is measured by the return on assets
(ROA) for each class of banks. Problems with
asset quality are measured by nonperformingFIGURE 2
Industry Performance
Measures by Bank Size
Percentage
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Percentage
B. Nonperforming Assets
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Percentage
0.0
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
assets as a percentage of total assets, and net
charge-offs for loan losses as a percentage of
total loans.
The panels in figure 2 illustrate how bank
profitability and problems with asset quality var-
ied across the five size classes of banks between
1984 and 1992. These performance measures re-
veal less of a discernible relationship to bank size
and holding company affiliation than do bank
lending and capitalization. Panel A indicates that
the ROA for very large banks was more volatile
than for smaller institutions. However, the differ-
ences in ROA do not indict size per se as an indi-
cator of profitability. This is especially true from
the perspective of bank stockholders; since larger
banks are more leveraged, stockholders can earn
a higher return on equity for a given ROA.
Panels B and C of figure 2 illustrate that
smaller (primarily agricultural) banks experienced
problems with asset quality in the mid-1980s.
These problems have been widely attributed to
the impact of local economic conditions. The dra-
matic rise in both nonperforming assets and loan
charge-offs by larger institutions from 1988 to
1991 is commonly viewed as stemming from the
troubled commercial real estate markets on the
East and West coasts. These disparate economic
conditions make it difficult to identify a consis-
tent relationship between bank size and asset





Both banking sector performance and broader
economic conditions varied widely across states
during the past decade. At the same time, restric-
tions on branching and on bank holding com-
pany acquisitions were being eased in many
states. In spite of these regulatory changes, a
great deal of structural diversity remains both
within and across state banking sectors. This di-
versity reflects the interaction of current regula-
tory environments with inherent market factors
(such as size or population density).
Table 3 summarizes the differences in bank-
ing sector conditions across states in 1984 and
1992 in terms of the maximum, median, and
minimum values of each measure as well as
their means and standard deviations. The data
mirror the trends evident at the national level,
yet the variation across states is striking.TABLE 3
State-Level Commercial
Banking Industry Ratios


























































































Table 4 presents the distribution of banks
within and across states by their holding com-
pany affiliation in 1984 and 1992. Each state is
ranked according to its total number of banks
in 1984. Industry consolidation has been the
rule rather than the exception in state banking
sectors. The number of banks fell in 42 states
during this period, and for 20 of these states
the numbers dropped by more than 20 percent,
although 38 states still had more than 50 banks
at the end of 1992. These declines were accom-
panied by a decrease in the number of inde-
pendent banks in 42 states. Overall, the
percentage of smaller holding company affili-
ates also fell. This, however, is due to signifi-
cant decreases in some states (most notably,
Texas), which outweigh the increases in these
affiliates in other states.
A trend toward one organizational type is
not evident at the state level. Savage (1993) ar-
gues that the coexistence of holding company
affiliates and independent banks within states
indicates that there is not yet a dominant form
of banking organization. The distribution of
banks by size varies more substantially across
states. In states with a tradition of unit banking,
the industry tends to be populated by a large
number of smaller institutions. As of year-end
1992, only 10 states had banks in the largest
size cohort. Seven states had no banks with
more than $1 billion (1987 dollars) in assets.
However, except for very large banks, each






The diversity in the types of banks within and
across states suggests a simple way of assess-
ing the extent to which variance in bank per-
formance can be attributed to differences in
bank characteristics versus local economic con-
ditions. In the following analysis, each state is
treated as an individual sector composed of
banks that vary in size and holding company
affiliation. I then test for differences in industry
profitability and asset quality that can be attrib-
uted to these structural characteristics, control-
ling for local economic conditions and other
state-specific fixed effects.
The analysis features state-level data over the
nine-year sample period of 1984 to 1992. As with
the evaluation of national-level trends, I disaggre-
gate state-level measures of industry conditions
into cohort-level measures for the five bank size
categories, crossed with the three types of hold-
ing company relationships. Hence, the annual
data yield 15 potential observations in each year
on industry conditions within a state. Not all
states have banks in each class.
9 The nine years
of data for 51 states (including the District of Co-
lumbia) yielded a data set of 4,062 observations
on a given measure of bank performance.
The rationale for analyzing the performance
of a cohort of banks rather than that of each
• 9 For example, almost all very large banks are multibank holding
company affiliates (two are affiliates of single bank holding companies). The
distribution of the data is discussed in the final section.TABLE 4






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































fourth quarter.individual bank is to mitigate the effects of out-
liers and bank mergers. The cohort measures
are averages of the individual banking data,
where each bank is effectively weighted by its
share of the cohort.
1
0 However, the findings
should be similar to those obtained using indi-
vidual bank data to assess differences across
these classes of banks. Moreover, in examining
the performance of classes of institutions, I can
construct estimates of the performance differen-
tials associated with bank size and holding
company affiliation. These adjusted measures
are directly comparable to the national-level
data presented in figures 1 and 2.
Data on banks sorted by size and holding
company affiliation within each state are used as
cross-sectional observations on banking condi-
tions in each year of the sample period. I then
pool the data for each year to estimate reduced-
form regressions for six measures of bank per-
formance. To identify variance in perfonnance
that may be attributed to differences in bank size
and holding company affiliation, I control for
other factors that affect banking conditions both
within each state and over time. In each regres-
sion, the following control variables are included:
1) a dummy variable identifying the state of an ob-
servation to control for state-specific differences in
banking conditions during the sample period; 2) a
dummy variable indicating the year of an observa-
tion to control for economywide variation in bank-
ing conditions over time; 3) the contemporaneous
and lagged values of both the growth rate of state
personal income and the volume of per capita
failed business liabilities to control for the effect of
local business conditions on banking sector per-
formance; and 4) the ratio of state banking assets
to state personal income in each year to control
for variation in banking sector activity relative to
that of the broader state economy.
Finally, to test whether bank size and hold-
ing company affiliation can explain differences
in bank performance, I include dummy vari-
ables in each regression that measure intercept
shifts for all classes of banks. Two different
specifications for each measure of industry con-
ditions are estimated; these vary the ways in
which the dummy variables are interacted with
• 10 This method mitigates the effects of outliers within a class of
banks. Outliers, in terms of a performance measure, will affect the measure
only to the extent of their relative importance in the cohort. For example, to
measure the ROA of small independent banks in each state (and each year), I
take the ratio of their aggregated net income to their aggregated assets. A
$50 million bank will, on average, contribute less to each term in the ratio
than a $100 million bank. Of course, this is also the case for the data gener-
ally used in industry analyses.
time to examine whether performance differ-
entials changed over the sample period. Both
regression specifications include the same
control variables and differ only in their treat-




Specification 1 includes an intercept shift for
each size class (Size) and type of bank holding
company affiliation (HCA) as well as the set of
control variables. This specification takes the form
(1) RationJAh = a-
i= 1
where Ration t s h is an observation of a bank
performance measure, in the «
t
h state and t
th
year, of banks in Size class 5 and HCA class h.
Econt n t(i = 1, ..., 5) is the set of state-level
economic variables that includes current and
lagged personal income growth, current and
lagged per capita failed business liabilities, and
the ratio of bank assets to personal income.
Here, the intercept shifts associated with Size
and HCA will measure how the average per-
formance of banks with these characteristics
varies. It is possible to estimate performance
differentials only relative to a base group in
each class. Very small banks are the Size base
group and multibank holding company affili-
ates are the HCA base group.
Table 5 presents selected results of the re-
gressions on six measures of banking condi-
tions (summarized in table 3) obtained using
specification 1. For brevity, the individual coef-
ficient estimates of the intercept shifts for each
state are not reported. However, they suggest
that significant differences in banking condi-
tions across states can be attributed to state-
specific factors (other than current economic
conditions) during the sample period. These
may reflect average differences in local indus-
try structure, including the structure of the
banking sector. Similarly, the estimated inter-
cept shifts for each year of the sample (relative
to the base year, 1992) indicate that in evaluat-
ing bank performance over time, it is impor-
tant to control for economywide trends that
affect banks in all states. These coefficient esti-
mates mirror the trends in banking conditions
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Holding Company Affiliation Dummies
Not in a bank holding company 0.0070
(3.33)
a
In single bank holding company - 0.0062
(-3.33)
a
































































































































































a. Significant at the 1 percent level.
b. Significant at the 5 percent level.
NOTE: T-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients of dummy variables indicate the intercept shift relative to the omitted category, as
indicated by dashed lines.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.FIGURE 3
Adjusted and Unadjusted Performance
Differentials in Return on Assets by
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table 2 and figure 3 (again, for brevity, the indi-
vidual coefficients are not reported).
Bank performance does appear to reflect lo-
cal economic conditions, particularly in regard
to bank profitability and asset quality. Both in-
come growth and failed business liabilities
help explain ROA, nonperforming assets, and
loan charge-offs in the expected ways. Profit-
ability as measured by bank ROA is positively
related to income growth and negatively re-
lated to failed business liabilities. Symmetrically,
asset problems measured in terms of both
nonperforming assets and loan charge-offs are
negatively related to income growth and posi-
tively related to failed business liabilities. C&I
lending—and to a lesser extent CRE lending—
is negatively related to failed business liabilities;
banks appear to fund fewer loans when the
credit quality of the local business sector dete-
riorates. However, the coefficients on state in-
come growth suggest that end-of-year lending
as a share of assets is also lower when recent
income growth has been higher. The coeffi-
cients on the ratio of banking assets to state
personal income are positive in the regressions
explaining both ROA and loan charge-offs.
Hence, when banking activity is high relative
to economic activity, both bank profitability
and problems with asset quality are higher as
well. Finally, bank capitalization is relatively
unrelated to the economic control variables.
These findings, then, reveal that the profit-
ability and asset quality of different segments
of the industry to a large degree reflect the
economic conditions impacting these institu-
tions: When the local economy has been far-
ing poorly, it is likely that the banking sector
will follow suit. This analysis is consistent with
most interpretations of banking trends. How-
ever, the results also hint that differences in
bank performance can be attributed to differ-
ences in bank characteristics.
The results for specification 1 yield signifi-
cant variations in banking conditions among
institutions having different holding company
relationships. Both single bank holding com-
pany affiliates and independent banks had a
smaller share of assets invested in CRE loans
than did multibank holding companies, while
only independent banks held a significantly
smaller share of C&I loans. Controlling for size,
independent banks were, on average, more
capitalized than multibank holding company
affiliates, while single bank holding company
affiliates were less capitalized. All else equal,
both independent banks and single bank hold-
ing company affiliates earned a higher ROAFIGURE 4
Adjusted and Unadjusted Performance
Differentials in Nonperforming Assets by
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than banks in multibank holding companies.
However, independent banks and single bank
holding company affiliates also had more prob-
lems on average with asset quality, as reflected
in nonperforming assets and loan charge-offs.
Thus, controlling for size, the performance
of banks in multibank holding companies dif-
fered from otherwise affiliated institutions; the
former earned a lower average ROA, but also
had fewer problems with asset quality. These
affiliates invested a larger share of their portfo-
lios in loans, but they appear to have been
better risks than both single bank holding com-
pany affiliates and independent banks in terms
of their performance during the past decade.
Bank performance also varied significantly
across the five size classes. As illustrated in
table 5, the differences in capitalization and in
lending mirror those evident in the national-
level data. The coefficients measuring the aver-
age differences in capitalization for each size
class indicate that controlling for other factors,
capitalization is inversely related to bank size.
These coefficients imply that on average, the
capital/asset ratio of very large banks was 3-9
percentage points lower than that of very small
banks. C&I lending as a share of assets is posi-
tively related to bank size. Alternatively, while
the middle three size classes of banks invested
a higher percentage of assets in CRE loans
than did very small banks, very large banks
held a significantly smaller share.
Perhaps not surprisingly, I find a less consis-
tent relationship between bank size and bank
performance in terms of profitability and asset
quality. All else equal, small and large banks
earned significantly higher ROAs than did
either very small or very large banks. Large
and very large banks had higher loan charge-
offs and lower nonperforming asset ratios than
did very small banks. Relatively small banks
($100 million to $500 million in assets, 1987
dollars) seem to have turned in the best per-
formance in terms of profitability and asset
quality. Interestingly, these banks are about
the size that some studies have shown to maxi-
mize economies of scale (Berger, Hanweck,
and Humphrey [1987]).
In summary, specification 1 estimates the
average differences in bank performance that
can be attributed to bank size and holding
company relationships, controlling for local
economic factors and aggregate trends that
affect banking conditions. Thus, the results
measure the extent to which the variation in
bank performance within states is related to
these structural characteristics. I find systematicFIGURE 5
Adjusted and Unadjusted Performance
Differentials In Mat Loan Charge-offs by
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differences in capitalization and lending across
banks that vary in their size and holding com-
pany relationships. Indeed, the disparities in
capitalization and lending observed at the na-
tional level appear to largely reflect these struc-
tural differences. The results also indicate some
variation in bank profitability and asset quality






The observed differences between large and
small banks may have changed during the past
decade. Estimating how the average perform-
ance of one type of bank (over a number of
years) compares to that of another may ob-
scure emerging differences in performance.
For example, because of greater asset diversifi-
cation, the asset quality of larger banks could
have been significantly better than that of
smaller banks early in the 1980s. If, indeed,
these institutions have increased the relative
risk of their investments (because they are too
big to fail), they may still be on par with small
banks in terms of average performance al-
though their asset quality has been declining.
To examine the possibility that staictural dis-
parities in bank performance have changed in
the past decade, I estimate a second set of
regressions:





Specification 2 includes an intercept shift for
each Size and HCA class for each year in the
sample period, as well as the control variables
included in specification 1. Again, it is possible
to estimate differences only relative to a base
group in each class; hence the choice of very
small banks as the Size base group and multi-
bank holding company affiliates as the HCA
base group. In these regressions, each inter-
cept shift associated with a class of banks
measures the estimated difference between the
performance of that class and its respective
base group in a particular year. Therefore, the
estimated performance differentials associated
with bank size and holding company relation-
ships are allowed to vary over time.Here, I present the evidence of performance
differentials in ROA, nonperforming assets, and
loan charge-offs obtained using specification 2.
The results for the control variables in these re-
gressions are similar to those presented in table 5.
Thus, I focus on patterns in the time-varying in-
tercept shifts associated with bank size and hold-
ing company affiliation. The intercept shifts can
be interpreted as annual bank performance differ-
entials that have been adjusted for state-specific
factors, local economic conditions, and economy-
wide trends. These adjusted performance differ-
entials are therefore estimates of the within-state
variations in bank performance attributable to
structural characteristics.
In figures 3, 4, and 5, the green lines illustrate
the adjusted performance differentials in ROA,
nonperforming assets, and loan charge-offs for
each Size class of banks. It is instructive to com-
pare these estimates to measured differences in
performance that have not been adjusted for
other economic factors. The national-level per-
formance measures presented in table 2 are used
to construct unadjusted performance differentials
of this sort for each Size class of banks. For exam-
ple, the unadjusted differential in the ROA of
very large banks in each year is simply the ROA
for this cohort of banks minus the ROA for very
small banks (as illustrated in figure 2). The unad-
justed performance differentials in ROA, nonper-
forming assets, and loan charge-offs are depicted
by the blue lines in figures 3, 4, and 5.
The panels in figure 3 illustrate both the
adjusted and unadjusted differences in ROA for
each Size class of banks (relative to very small
banks). A comparison of these series indicates
that controlling for other economic factors miti-
gates the relatively poor performance of larger
banks in recent years. The adjusted differentials in
ROA for small banks suggest that, all else equal,
they were more profitable than very small banks
during the entire sample period. However, the
adjusted differentials for the three largest classes
reveal no emerging trends in profitability differen-
tials that can be attributed to bank size per se.
The panels in figure 4 depict the unadjusted
and adjusted differentials in nonperforming as-
sets by Size class. The adjusted series do not ex-
hibit the increasing disparities between sizes that
are evident in the unadjusted data. Panels A and
B do indicate that, all else equal, larger banks
had significantly higher nonperforming asset ra-
tios than did smaller banks in the late 1980s. Sub-
sequently, however, the differences attributable
to size decreased.
Finally, the panels in figure 5 illustrate both
the adjusted and unadjusted differences in loan
charge-offs for various-sized banks. The ad-
justed differentials are measurably smaller than
the unadjusted ones. As in the case of nonper-
forming assets, controlling for other economic
factors mitigates the emerging relationship be-
tween size and asset quality problems sug-
gested by the unadjusted measures. However,
again, it does appear that larger banks showed
more asset quality problems than did smaller
banks during the late 1980s.
The key result yielded by these series is that,
controlling for economic factors, there is no
evidence of a trend toward increasing dispari-
ties in bank performance that can be attributed
to bank size as a structural characteristic. Simi-
larly, the estimated performance differentials for
the HCA classes do not suggest emerging dis-
parities in bank profitability and asset quality




One interpretation of observed bank perform-
ance in the past decade is that the disparities be-
tween larger and smaller banks may indicate that
increasing risks are being borne by the largest
players (Boyd and Gertler [19931). Accordingly,
the trend toward larger banks has been viewed
with some concern. This paper investigates the
merits of this perception by descriptively assess-
ing the extent to which differences in banking
conditions can be attributed to variations in bank
size and holding company affiliation.
Taking local economic factors into considera-
tion reduces the disparities in bank performance
attributable to these structural characteristics.
There is some evidence that, after controlling for
state-specific fixed effects, local economic condi-
tions, and national-level trends, larger banks per-
formed worse during the 1980s than did smaller
institutions. However, the trend appears to have
since reversed. In addition, the results indicate
that, all else equal, banks that are associated with
larger organizations through multibank holding




• 11 In interpreting these findings, it is important to note that I am
evaluating cohort-level banking conditions. Smaller banks that grow
large because they are profitable are allowed to be reclassified into larger
size cohorts. On the other hand, banks that are poor performers also may
leave their cohorts as they are either closed or merged into larger institu-
tions. Although beyond the scope of this study, it would be interesting to
examine the extent to which trends in banking sector performance have
been associated with changes in the population of banks across size
classes and holding company affiliations.One potential explanation for the finding
that large banks performed relatively poorly is
that these institutions may be more likely to
make loans outside their locality. To the extent
that this is true, I do not control for economic
conditions where they made loans. An obvious
example is the case of the huge write-offs asso-
ciated with loans to developing countries. The
rationale for controlling for local economic con-
ditions is that certain institutions are more sub-
ject to these conditions. Thus, evidence that
less constrained firms are riskier may suggest
that they could and did take on more risk dur-
ing the past decade.
In assessing the performance of large banks,
it is also important to note that most of these in-
stitutions are part of multibank holding compa-
nies. Thus, a study of the behavior of large banks
is effectively a study of the joint effects of both
large size and this form of banking organization.
On the other hand, the evidence indicates that,
all else equal, multibank holding company affili-
ations appear to benefit banks. This suggests that
smaller affiliates have not experienced the same
problems with asset quality as have larger institu-
tions. Thus, it seems that the performance of
larger banks reflects the effects of size rather
than holding company status per se. Indeed, risk-
ier loans may have been channeled to larger
banks in the holding companies.
The results of this analysis indicate that the
U.S. banking industry during the 1980s may have
been characterized by a duality related to bank
size. Although reregulation in the past several
years has attempted to address this possibility,
the evolving role of banks indicates that the link
between bank size and bank performance mer-
its further study from a regulatory perspective.
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